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The Lawyer and the Terrorist:
Another Ethical Dilemma
F. THOMAS SCHORNHORST*
No great insight is required to conclude that any consideration of the
function of lawyers in the context of terrorism is paradoxical. Terrorism,
among other things, involves the use of violently coercive means to achieve
personal or political ends-the very means against which the Rule of Law is
set. Though terroristic acts may be viewed as ultimate expressions of injustice,
they occur because legal and peaceful methods of reaching the desired goals
have been perceived by the actors as inadequate or because they have been
rejected altogether. A person trained as a lawyer may provide guidance and
protection for those who choose to stay or are brought within the complex
structure that is the legal order. However employed, the lawyer's raison d'etre
is peaceful avoidance or resolution of disputes through a sometimes bitterly
adversarial, but rationally-based system of law and legal institutions.
Therefore he or she seems hardly the person whose peculiar talents would be
in great demand once terrorists have converted plans to action.
But it may be because we are a society so accustomed to seeking aid,
solace and leadership from our lawyers that we find some of them mobilized
along with the SWAT teams and the bomb squads on occasions of hostage-
taking acts of terrorism-where words rather than bullets and tear gas are the
first order of business. A lawyer's ability aid experience in negotiation may
be valued in such instances, although persons more formally trained in
human behavior may be better suited to that function.' Of greater impor-
tance would be a lawyer's advice to the authorities as to the limits of permissi-
ble force, lawful methods of acquiring and preserving evidence, and assuring
due process of law to the hostage-taker(s) upon surrender or capture.
What has been said. so far contemplates the lawyer's intervention on
behalf of the "good guys" or, at least, as a neutral observer. But what of the
lawyer called into the situation by or on behalf of the lawbreaker? - or of the
lawyer who assumes that role? To what extent, if at all, do any of the ethical
rules or considerations that purport to describe both the obligations and the
limits of lawyering apply? Even the most thoughtful and provocative examina-
tions of the subject have left this specific problem unexplored.2
*Professor of Law, Indiana University
'See generally, F. HAcKER. CRUSADERS. CRIMINALS, CRAZIES (1976). Dr. Frederick F.
Hacker is a psychiatrist who has written extensively on the problems of international terrorism.
2See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060
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A recent, personal experience with lawyers who either unwillingly or un-
wittingly found themselves faced with choices dictated by these hard questions
has provoked this attempt to analyze the issue.3
THE CASE OF ANTHONY G. KIRITSIS
4
The Abduction
At the start of the business day of February 8, 1977, Anthony G. "Tony"
Kiritsis paid the last of his many visits to the fourth floor offices of the Meri-
dian Mortgage Company in Indianapolis, Indiana. He had been there dozens
of times during the past four years to discuss with M. L. Hall, the head of
the company, and his son, Richard, his hopes and plans for the commercial
development of a 17-acre tract of land on the west side of Indianapolis. The
$130,000 mortgage on the land was due on March 1, 1977, and Meridian,
having already extended Kiritsis' promissory note for two years beyond its
original due date, had told him there could not be another extension. The
debt was to be paid or the mortgage would be foreclosed. Kiritsis had on this
day neither the money nor prospects and had resolved to take action of a dif-
ferent sort.
The company receptionist, a temporary employee filling in for an absent
worker, perceived no threat from the rather curious little man in his mid-
forties who wore only a cardigan sweater against the cold and windy day. His
left arm was thrust into a blue sling looped around his neck, and in his free
arm he carried what appeared to be rolled up plans or blueprints and a card-
board suitbox from a local department store. He asked first to see the senior
Mr. Hall, and being told that he was wintering in Florida, asked to see his
son, Richard. Richard was not yet in the office, but was expected shortly.
Kiritsis and the receptionist chatted until he arrived.
When he came in Richard Hall noticed Kiritsis and invited him to join
him in his father's office. He was not surprised to see him there. Some days
earlier Kiritsis had asked that a pay-off statement be prepared. Hall, also
noting the rolled up plans, anticipated that their discussion would involve the
payment of the mortgage and more on the development of Kiritsis' real
estate. During the past four years Hall had sat in on many discussions be-
tween Kiritsis and his father, M. L. Hall, concerning proposed development of
(1976). For a critical appraisal of Freedman's book, see Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 622 (1976).
'While on a sabbatical leave from Indiana University School of Law in 1976-77, I served
as a Deputy Prosecutor in Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis). During that period I was one
of the prosecutors assigned to the case of State v. Anthony G. Kiritsis, CR77-44A, Marion County
Criminal Court, filed Feb. 14, 1977. The observations I make in this article are based upon my
experience in that case.4The narrative of the events is based upon the testimony and exhibits that were introduced
during lengthy pretrial hearings and during the trial itself. Footnotes referring to specific sources
will be used only when direct or indirect quotations are taken from available transcripts.
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the ground. Over that time he had come to regard Kirtisis as an intense,
emotional and suspicious person whose business talents fell considerably short
of those required to put together successfully the kind of land development
deal that was his dream.5 Hall was pleased not only at the prospect of the
repayment of the money that his company was owed, but also at the depar-
ture of a problem client.
Inside the office, only a few steps away from the reception area, Kiritsis
made a curious request. "Dick, do you mind if I close the door? My shorts are
killing me and I want to adjust them." Hall told him to go ahead and turned
his attention to some papers on the desk. A few seconds later he looked up to
see Kiritsis facing him. The sling had been removed from his arm and a han-
dgun was aimed at Hall's chest. 6 Hall was ordered to remove his coat and tie
and to sit in the chair with his back to Kiritsis. From the suitbox came a
sawed-off .12 gauge shotgun. A cable loop that had been attached to the for-
ward end of the gun was slipped over Hall's head and tightened around his
neck. The stock of the gun had been sawed-off and shaped like a pistol grip.
A cable attached to the trigger led through a hole drilled in the rear of the
trigger guard, and formed another loop that Kiritsis placed around his own
neck.
A Telephone Call and the Walk Down Washington Street
Kiritsis reached for the telephone and dialed 911, the police emergency
number. When the dispatcher answered, he was ready with his instructions:
[N]ow I want you to send two police officers to this address and I'll tell you
what you can tell them, I've got a twelve guage sawed off automatic shotgun,
I've got a dead man's line on the trigger, there's three shells in the fucking
gun, there's one in the chamber and a man with the gun on his neck, wrap-
ped around it with a cable that's holding the fucking safety in his hand and
if anybody yanks on me, yanks the gun, makes a false fucking move, he will
die right here, now I know they'll do anything to save this man's life, because
everybody thinks I'm, they are going to think that I'm a [mad] man, me a
deranged mother fucker, well I ain't, I'm mad at these mother fuckers trying
to take everything that I've got. ... 7
5At trial the defense, supported by psychiatric testimony, made much of the point that
Kiritsis had for the four years preceding these events devoted his entire energy to the develop-
ment of a shopping center on his land. A series of defense witnesses (relations and friends of
Kiritsis) testified that "his land was his life." Several psychiatrists who had examined Kiritsis
testified that Kiritsis claimed to have had a "vision" of himself dead on March 1, 1977, and that
he seemed to equate the foreclosure of the mortgage with the taking of his life. He also told the
examining doctors that he thought the Halls had Mafia connections [which, of course, they did
not] and that they were going to have him killed. His action against them, he claimed, was a
kind of pre-emptive self-defense.
6Kirtisis had been planning his move for a long time. Some days earlier he paid a visit to
the Halls' office with his arm in a sling and explained to Richard Hall that he was to have an
operation on his arm. This, he later told psychiatrists, was to throw them off guard. The sling
also provided a convenient place for concealing a handgun.
'The quotation is from transcription of tape recordings that the Indianapolis police
routinely make of 911 emergency calls..
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The conversation continued in a similar vein for over half an hour. Kirit-
sis was trying to make sure that no one would interfere with him as he, accor-
ding to his plan, moved his hostage from the office to his apartment a few
miles to the west. He demanded a car and warned repeatedly that if anyone
tried to shoot or capture him the rig on the shotgun would cause it to
discharge and kill Richard Hall. When it appeared that the police did not in-
tend to send anyone into the office, Kiritsis, with the shotgun attached,
ordered Hall to move to the stairway. They walked down four flights of stairs,
through a narrow lobby and out onto the sidewalk of Market Street-barely a
block away from the City-County Building that housed Police Headquarters
and the Criminal Courts. The temperature on a nearby bank thermometer
read 11 F. Both men were in their shirtsleeves.
The scenes filmed from this point on by television news cameramen must
surely make the abduction one of the most memorable in criminal history.
Flanked by straggling columns of incredulous and helpless police officers,
Kiritsis marched his hostage to a nearby parking garage in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to commandeer a vehicle. Announcing to his hostage they would "walk
the seven miles" he then headed Hall to the west along Washington Street-a
major Indianapolis thoroughfare. For four blocks Kiritsis kept up a string of
threats and epithets directed at his victim and at the police officers around
him. At one point he became so angry he jerked Hall around, the cable at-
tached to the shotgun cutting into his neck. Hall slipped on some ice and
began to fall. Kiritsis flexed his knees to go down with him and later
wondered why the gun did not go off.
A block further on he encountered a police car stopped at an intersec-
tion. Kiritsis forced the driver out of the car, took a pair of handcuffs from
another officer, got into the front seat of the car from the left side and pulled
Hall into the driver's seat. He directed Hall to drive to his apartment in the
Crestwood Village complex on the west side of Indianapolis.
Once inside the apartment, Hall was handcuffed, chained to a heavy
metal weight and locked inside the bathroom. All over the apartment were
placed strings with keys attached at various places. Kiritsis would later warn
the authorities outside that this was all part of an intricate detonating device
that would cause the apartment to blow up should any attempt be made to
enter forcibly through a door or window. He was taken at his word.8
8Kirtisis was reported to be familiar with explosives and the police heard rumors about his
having recently acquired an amount of dynamite. However, the explosives later found in his
apartment were two one-gallon wine jugs filled with gasoline. Although he dismantled his
detonating device before leaving his apartment, he apparently had rigged a metal weight to drop
on the jugs, break the glass and release the gasoline. The gasoline fumes would have been ignited
by the flame of a candle. Also he could have broken the bottles by shooting through them.
[Vol. 53:679
ETHICAL DILEMMA
Enter the Lawyers
As the various police agencies9 began to set up for what was to be a
63-hour stand off, a conference telephone call to Kiritsis was arranged by a
deputy sheriff, a personal friend. 10 Participating in the conversation with
Kiritsis were Indianapolis Chief of Police Eugene Gallagher, Marion County
Sheriff Larry Broderick, Kiritsis' brother, Jimmy, and his half-brother,
George Urgo. The brothers had been summoned hurriedly after Kiritsis
revealed his identity to the police dispatcher during his call from Hall's office.
During this conversation the authorities began to understand the abduc-
tor's motivation and his demands. He believed that Hall's mortgage company
was out to get his land; that they had misused confidential information he
had given them; had tried to attract his own prospects to other sites in which
they had a financial interest; and had actively discouraged potential tenants
and other financial institutions from doing business with him. Because of this
alleged deceit he was unable to pay off his mortgage." In exchange for Hall's
life he had to be assured of the following:
1. He was not to be "arrested, booked, fingerprinted, mugged", he
was not be be made to spend any time in jail; and was not to be re-
quired to see a psychiatrist.
2. The mortgage company was to admit all the wrongs they had
done to him (he refused to be more specific because "they", the
mortgage company, would know what the wrongs were).
3. He was to be paid appropriate damages for his lost profits (his
deals, he claimed, were worth millions).
4. He was to be indemnified by the mortgage company for any civil
liability that might flow from his acts (he was worried that, among
other things, someone may have suffered a heart attack while witness-
ing the abduction).
Given the discussion about documents, damages and other legal sounding
claims it was only logical that the conversation turned to lawyers and "legal
representation" for Kiritsis. Both Urgo and Chief Gallagher pressed Kiritsis
for the names of lawyers whom he would want to represent him. From this
discussion emerged the names of two lawyers, John C. Ruckelshaus and
Charles Wilson, who had in the past represented or advised Kiritsis in civil
9At the scene were units from the Indianapolis Police Department, Marion County Sheriff's
Department, and Indiana State Police. Also involved at one time or another were federal agents
from the FBI and the Department of the Treasury (Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms Division).
'
0Kiritsis had over the years cultivated several friends in the various local police agencies. A
number of these police friends later testified in support of Kiritsis' insanity defense.
"During the course of the trial it was established that the mortgage company was guilty of
no wrongdoing with regard to Kiritsis.
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matters and in whom he apparently had trust. Upon completion of this
conversation, and in anticipation of dealing with Kiritsis' lawyers, the police
called the Marion County Prosecutors Office to summon up legal rein-
forcements. Quickly three deputy prosecutors were brought into the case.
They were David Rimstidt, the Chief Deputy (who, as it happened, was the
ranking prosecutor available because the Prosecutor, James Kelley, was atten-
ding a conference in California), George Martz, a seasoned trial deputy, and
Robert Thompson, the deputy in charge of the felony screening division.
In the meantime the Sheriff telephoned Wilson, described to him the
situation and the just concluded conversation with Kiritsis, and asked him to
establish contact with his former client.1 2 Chief Gallagher conveyed the same
message to Ruckelshaus. Wilson and Ruckelshaus quickly got together and a
division of labor soon evolved. By 4:00 p.m. on the day of the kidnapping
Kiritsis had on line his "criminal lawyer" (Ruckelshaus) and his "civil lawyer"
(Wilson).
Negotiations and the Emergence of Adversarial Roles
A Question of Immunity.
First, and seemingly foremost, was Kiritsis' demand that he suffer no
legal consequences for his actions with regard to Hall. This came to be refer-
red to as a demand for "immunity" although in technical legal terms it is
more accurately viewed as a demand seeking a promise of no prosecution.'
The authorities conducting the negotiations realized that if they started the
discussion at this point it could quickly lead to impasse and increase the risk
of precipitate and violent reaction. With this in mind they concentrated
throughout the balance of Tuesday, February 8, and for most of the next
day, on Kiritsis' complaints against the mortgage company. By Wednesday
afternoon Chief Gallagher, who had been frequently on the telephone with
Kiritsis, was beginning to discern some progress. The mortgage company had
issued a public apology for whatever wrongs they had done him, and Kiritsis
had been able to hear his own rambling complaints against the mortgage
company aired by a local radio station.' 4
In the meantime, deputy prosecutors had set to work drafting an "im-
munity agreement" which, according to them, was to be employed as the
'"Wilson called Kiritsis and confirmed his demands. When he asked Kiritsis if he also
wanted the mortgage on his land released Kiritsis said no, because it was not one of his demands.
"... I am Tony Kirtisis and I'll pay my obligation when it becomes due." Transcript of Hearing
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information, State v. Anthony G. Kiritsis, CR77-44A, at 646
(Marion County Crim. Ct., April 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Transcript].
"Immunity under Indiana law may be granted only by a court upon the request of a pro-
secutor in situations where a witness in a criminal proceeding lawfully claims a privilege against
self-incrimination. IND. CODE § 35-6-3-1 (1976). For a discussion of non-statutory forms of im-
munity, see Comment, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 334 (1974).
14On the day of the abduction Kiritsis called Fred Heckman, news director of radio station
WIBC. Heckman, with Kiritsis' eager cooperation, taped their lengthy conversations and broad-
cast parts of them.
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final hole card in case of a life or death showdown. A telephone conversation
on Wednesday between Deputy Prosecutor George Martz, Kiritsis,
Ruckelshaus and Wilson, led them to the conclusion that the demand for im-
munity was "non-negotiable." Both lawyers told Martz that, given their
knowledge of their client, he would accept nothing less. Martz stalled for time
saying that no action could be taken along these lines until cleared by Pro-
secutor Kelley who was still in California. In fact Kelley and his deputies had
been in frequent telephone contact prior to this meeting, and Kelley had ap-
proved of the plan to offer Kiritsis immunity should, in the judgment of the
deputies at the scene, it be necessary to save Hall's life. The prosecutors also
had agreed at this point that they would not consider themselves bound by
any such promise if given.
Although both the prosecutors and the private attorneys had as their
main objective the prevention of harm to the hostage, the latter clearly were
feeling tugs of loyalty to their client.' 5
A Crisis, A Lie and a Bluff.
Late Wednesday afternoon, February 9, the police and the prosecutors
had to turn their hole card. Kiritsis heard a radio broadcast from an on-the-
scene reporter that the bomb squad was readying some mats and other equip-
ment, and that this might signal an attempt to break through the walls of the
apartment, capture Kiritsis and rescue Hall.1 6 Kiritsis was infuriated. Accor-
ding to Hall, he became angrier than he had been during the abduction
itself. He was on the brink of losing control. During that day Kiritsis'
brothers, a friend, and some police acquaintances had been staying in an
apartment across the hall and had been communicating with him through
the door. Now he screamed at them to get out because he was going to blow
up the building. They left.
There followed in quick succession a series of telephone calls. First Kirit-
sis called Gallagher at the police command post cursing and claiming that he
was going to blow up the building and kill Hall. He demanded that
Gallagher come to the apartment that his brothers had just vacated and
slammed the receiver down. Attempts by Gallagher to call him back and
calm him down were unsuccessful. Then, at the urging of the police, Fred
15For Ruckelshaus, a partisan attitude toward the prosecutors was perhaps inevitable. He
had for several months been representing a number of Indianapolis police officers who, through
the efforts of Prosecutor Kelley, had been charged with perjury, accepting bribes and other acts
of corruption. The prosecutors were his natural and none-too-friendly adversaries. Wilson, on the
other hand, specialized in real estate transactions, and the rough and tumble world of the
criminal lawyer was foreign to him. With this in mind, Wilson stayed in the background as the
immunity matter was discussed. His turn was to come the following day when the negotiations
turned to "damages" in the millions of dollars.
"The report came from Doug O'Brien, the WIBC news reporter on the scene.
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Heckman, the news director of WIBC radio station who had taped and aired
previous telephone conversations with Kiritsis, and who seemed to have
developed a friendly rapport with him, attempted also to call and calm him
down. He too got nothing but threats and curses.
Back at the command post the worried police and prosecutors felt they
had to do something-give Kiritsis something. They consulted a psychiatrist
who had been helping them monitor the situation and who had heard Kirit-
sis' outbursts. It was possible, he said, that Kiritsis was losing control and was
at that point homicidal. The prosecutors, Rimstidt and Thompson,17 and
Chief Gallagher quickly concluded that the time for tendering the immunity
agreement had come-if they waited any longer it could be too late.
Gallagher called Kiritsis and told him the authorities were ready to
discuss immunity.' 8 Kiritsis, still highly emotional, refused to discuss it. At
this point "Dutch" Sheffer, an old friend of Kiritsis who had been among
those in the apartment across the hall, offered to call and tell him about the
immunity. His friend's voice had the desired calming effect and he read the
immunity agreement to Kiritsis telling him that "it was the most legal looking
document" he had ever seen. Ever the suspicious negotiator, Kiritsis ordered
the document to be delivered to his attorneys and said that he would discuss
it with them in the morning. With the storm apparently weathered, everyone
settled down to wait.19
The following morning there was an awkward meeting between Deputy
Prosecutor Rimstidt, Ruckelshaus, and Wilson. They had gathered in
Wilson's office to review the immunity agreement that had been promised to
Kiritsis. At the outset Rimstidt asked each attorney whether he regarded
Kiritsis as his client, and each assured him that he did. This inquiry, accor-
ding to Rimstidt's later testimony, was to determine how candid he could be
concerning the prosecutors' plans. Having concluded earlier that such a pro-
mise would be unenforceable at law, Kelley and his deputies decided that if
the tender of immunity became necessary it would be offered only as a
ploy-a ruse to get Kiritsis to come out and release his hostage. 20 Rimstidt's
"At this crucial point the third and most experienced deputy prosecutor, George Martz,
was on his way to the airport to meet and brief an FBI expert on crisis intervention whose ser-
vices had been requested by local authorities.
"'Hearing Transcript at 139-40.
1 5The danger to the hostage at this point was greater than anyone on the outside realized.
Kiritsis took Hall from the bathroom and reattached the shotgun with its "dead man's cable"
around his own and Hall's neck. The two then sat at a table through most of the night. Hall
testified later that he feared that either Kiritsis or he would doze off causing the gun to fire.
"0On the rare occasions when courts have had to deal with attempts to enforce promises of
immunity obtained through terroristic threats they have agreed that such promises are unen-
forceable. In United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975). and United States v.
Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the defendants were prisoners in the District of Col-
umbia jail who had attempted an armed escape. In the course of the attempt they took several
guards as hostages and later took as a hostage the D.C. Corrections Director, Kenneth Hardy.
The hostages were abused physically and used as shields when the prisoners tried unsuccessfully
to force authorities to open the outside gates. During the course of his confinement, Hardy was
[Vol. 53:679
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problem now was whether to carry the deception through with Wilson and
Ruckelshaus. He had learned enough about Kiritsis' personality in the
preceding two days to conclude that either withdrawal of the immunity, or
revealing its false nature, would trigger yet another enraged outburst and its
attendant homicidal risks. If these men were really Kiritsis' lawyers, he felt
that he could not risk giving the plan away to them because, if he did, they
may have felt obligated to tell their client. And this is exactly what would
have happened, according to Ruckelshaus:
Prosecutor: Now if George Martz, or any of the people in the Command
Post had told you prior to the defendant's apprehension that the immunity
agreement would not be honored, would you have passed that information on
to your client?
Ruckelshaus: They know damn well I would have ... and that's exactly
...why ...They know if they'd told me what they were going to do I
would have told him.
2
1
As he read the document Ruckelshaus noted that it covered only acts
committed on February 8th and 9th. Since it was now the 10th, and the
hostage had not been released, he suggested an amendment to include the
10th. Rimstidt agreed readily.
Ruckelshaus then applied the pressure. Looking Rimstidt directly in the
eye and pointing his finger at him Ruckelshaus said, "now you're not going to
forced to sign a promise that he would undertake no reprisals or legal action against inmates in-
volved in the uprising.
Having later been convicted of several serious felonies committed during the attempted
escape, a number of the prisoners invoked the theory of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971), and sought reversal of their convictions arguing that Hardy, as agent for the United
States Attorney, had granted them immunity from prosecution. The court's response to this argu-
ment was:
S.. (T)he decision in Santobello on which appellants would rely involved fundamental
principles of contract law, notably those concerning mutually binding promises freely
given in exchange for valid consideration. These factors were not present in Hardy's
"negotiations" with the rebellious inmates. The prisoner's tacit guarantee that no fur-
ther violence would ensue promised only the performance of a pre-existing duty, a
typical example of invalid consideration. The promise Hardy offered in exchange was
secured through the most patent sort of duress and thus was voidable. Were his agree-
ment to be construed as an absolute immunization of appellants from prosecution, it
would be contrary to public policy and nudum pactum.
523 F.2d at 1109-10. Similarly, the defendants in State v. Rollin, 359 A.2d 315 (R.I. 1976),
relied on a promise of immunity from prosecution given to rebellious state prison inmates by the
Rhode Island Director of Corrections. The promise was made upon the inmates' threat to kill a
hostage they had taken during the uprising unless their demands for immunity and other conces-
sions were granted. Rejecting this argument,the court stated:
Promises extorted through violence and coercion are no promises at all; they are void
from the beginning and unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
• ..We conclude our consideration of this issue by stating that even if the director
had the power to make the alleged promises, they would be unenforceable as a matter
of public policy because they were secured by violence and coercion.
Id. at 318.2 1Hearing Transcript at 599.
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piss backwards on this are you?" 22 As Ruckelshaus described the scene in
court, Rimstidt made a "few squirms and turns" and he followed up, "'now
do you know what I mean by that? That you are not going to dishonor this
but you're going to live up to it?' He said, 'yes."' 23 Apparently the subject was
dropped at that point without discussion of other things that might have been
of interest to lawyers such as (1) the authority of the prosecutors to agree to
such terms; (2) whether a court might later declare the agreement void as a
matter of public policy and even appoint a special prosecutor; and (3) the
impact of duress upon the validity of the promise and of the assurances that
it would be honored.
To paint the prosecutors further into a corner, Ruckelshaus stipulated a
condition not demanded by Kiritsis: that George Martz go on live television
"at a prearranged time with Toni [sic] . . .where he would reaffirm the
validity of the written immunity which Toni [sic] had then seen and would
also state that they would continue to honor in the future." 24 This stipulation
was requested, Ruckelshaus said, in order to assure his client of the existence
of the promises, "I told them that it was legal if they continued to live up to
it, and then I wanted them as a proof of their sincerity to tell Toni [sic] that
publically [sic], and whoever else was looking on TV. ... 25
As indicated by this excerpt Ruckelshaus had become not only an ad-
viser, but an advocate for Kiritsis. Later on Thursday, as the end of the crisis
drew near, he continued in the same role. Kiritsis, with his supposed im-
munity from prosecution by the state safely tucked away, raised for the first
time the question of federal immunity.2 6 This sent the prosecutors scurrying
to the telephone in an unsuccessful attempt to contact someone at some level
in the federal government who could provide such an assurance. Ruckelshaus
testified that he would not advise Kiritsis that federal immunity was valid
"unless we have the same conditions that we did with the [state], and that is
we have a federal man get on [TV] and say, yes it is valid, and yes it will be
lived up to."'27 When someone half-seriously suggested that one of the local
prosecutors go on TV purporting to be an Assistant United States Attorney
offering Kiritsis federal immunity, Ruckelshaus objected vehemently
indicating that he would reveal such a scheme to his client.2 8 Because of
intervening events29 the question of federal immunity was dropped and was
not a factor in bringing the episode to a close.
52 d. at 547.
55Id. at 548.5 1d. at 554.
25 d.
26Kiritsis apparently was sophisticated enough legally to know that had he violated federal
law by possessing a sawed-off shotgun. See 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (c) (1970).
t5 Hearing Transcript at 558.
281d. at 559.
25Late on Thursday, February 11, Kiritsis received a document prepared by the mortgage
company representatives that "confessed" to the wrongs Kiritsis claimed to have been done to
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A New Round of Negotiation-Wilson Picks Up the Ball.
As the third day of the abduction wore into evening and as the immunity
issue seemed to have been resolved, Kiritsis demanded a more specific confes-
sion by the mortgage company of the wrongs they had done to him. Repre-
sentatives of the company set to work developing such a list based upon the
various claims Kiritsis had been making over the past two and one-half days.
He called upon Wilson and through him began negotiating for the damages
that he claimed were due him because of the mortgage company's inter-
ference with his business prospects. Failing in his attempt to get the mortgage
company officers to name a figure, Kiritsis started the bidding at $12 million.
Although Wilson would later describe his actions in the ensuing negoia-
tions as those of an "errand boy"-i.e., conveying offers and counteroffers
between Kiritsis and the Meridian executives he, too, assumed to some extent
the role of advocate. When one of the company representatives (another
lawyer) proposed a payment of $3,000 to $4,000, Wilson characterized the of-
fer as "ridiculous and not [in] keeping with what I thought Tony had in
mind."30 Finally, through a series of telephone calls, which included some
ludicrous discussions of tax liability and attorneys fees,3' Kiritsis, through
Wilson, agreed to accept $5 million, but only after having been warned that
the company was worth no more than that.
Just as Ruckelshaus had structured the immunity issue so as to make it
difficult (or at least embarrassing) for the state to back down, Wilson attemp-
ted to preserve a legal position for his client with respect to this transaction.
Note the following exchange between Kiritsis and Wilson: 32
Kiritsis (K): In your opinion, sir, was that note as good as some of the paper
we see around here right now? [Referring to papers strewn about counsel
table].
Wilson (W): Well frankly-you're asking me for my current opinion as to its
validity?
K: Your professional opinion, you're an attorney, sir.
W: As to its validity?
K: Yes sir.
W: Well I doubt very seriously if it is [valid]-I know it would not be
honored without a certain amount of contest on behalf of the maker of the
him. According to Hall, this document so infuriated Kiritsis that he came out and held the "news
conference" described in the text at 690-91, infra.
'
0 Hearing Transcript at 656. Wilson felt that such a low offer would further infuriate Kirit-
sis. Id. at 785.
11d. at 661-62, 787. Wilson testified that he felt Kiritsis wanted to know how much he
would net out of the deal. Id. at 663. Neither Wilson nor Ruckelshaus were serious about the fee
that Kiritsis was willing to pay (five percent of $5 million or $250,000 each).
s"Kiritsis had been allowed to enter his appearance and act as co-counsel during the pre-
trial hearings. In his questioning of Ruckelhaus and Wilson, Kiritsis revealed his belief that they
were a part of the "conspiracy" to lie to him. During the latter stages of this hearing, Kiritsis and
his then attorney, Owen Mullen, developed irreconcilable differences and Mullen withdrew from
the case.
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note obviously. In the context of or in the course of the negotiation, consis-
tent with what we saw then as appropriate action, we tried to develop the
thought that you had agreed to come down and to release this man, so that
the idea of duress was no longer a factor ...So I don't have an opinion as
to whether or not it is valid. My thought then and my thought still is that- -
question of its validity terms and whether or not it was still then under duress
[sic]. And that's the question of fact for a Judge to decide, not me.-S
With the matter of "damages" seemingly settled, Kiritsis appeared ready
to come out. In telephone conversations with Chief Gallagher he agreed to
leave his shotgun in the apartment, bring Hall down the stairs and deliver
him to Gallagher at the landing. A car was to be waiting for Kiritsis to take
him to his brother's home. At about 10:00 p.m. Kiritsis came out, but the
shotgun was fastened around Hall's neck as it had been on the morning of
the abduction. The "dead man's cable" was in place around Kiritsis' neck.
He marched Hall straight to the lobby of the apartment building where
the police had their command post. The room quickly filled with news
photographers, TV cameramen, reporters and policemen. Yelling at them to
"get the cameras rolling" Kiritsis embarked upon a 40-plus minute wild-eyed,
obscenity-laden diatribe during which he alternately poked and menaced Hall
with the shotgun and shed tears of self-pity. Once again the police stood by
helplessly as this incredible display was televised live, in living color and in
prime time.34
Throughout this "news conference" Kiritsis made repeated demands for
the "agreement" to be delivered to him. Wilson testified, "There was a great
deal of speculation as to what agreement was being referred to. And someone
said, draft the note. So in the confusion I drafted a note"3 5 for $5 million
payable to Kiritsis. And as Kiritsis continued his televised display amidst
growing feelings of horror that he might either intentionally or accidently
discharge the shotgun pressed into Hall's neck, Wilson frantically searched for
a mortgage company officer to sign the note.
His own testimony best describes this sequence:
Q. ... [W]ell who signed the promissory note, finally?
A. Signed? Well I'd set it up as I drafted it, in anticipation of having it signed by Jerry
Gowen who was known to be a high mortgage officer and by Art Northrup [an at-
torney who apparently was representing the company]. Unfortunately we could not
find those individuals to sign it. And [the] Police Chief [Gallagher] grabbed it and
signed Arthur Northrup's signature ...and wanted to sign Jerry Gowen's signature.
Q: He signed both names?
A: No. He wanted to sign the other name as well and Ruckelshaus and I would not let
him do so.
"3Hearing Transcript at 664-65.
"For a discussion of the role of the media in this context, see Jaehnig, Journalists and Ter-
rorism: Captives of the Libertarian Tradition, 53 IND. L.J. - (1978).35Hearing Transcript at 660.
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Q. Who eventually did sign [the other signature]?
A: Well we looked high and low for an officer of Meridan Mortgage and were not able
to find one .... And finding no one we looked upon a minor officer, whose name I
frankly forget, within Meridian Mortgage and asked him to sign the note on behalf of
Meridian Mortgage, which he did.
Q: The question of his authority as to do so being somewhat questionable?
A: Well he did a certain amount of hemming and hawing about his authority. And we
said to him at the time, no one's forcing you to do it, if you want to do it fine, if you
don't want to do it that's fine also.
Q: And what was your purpose in-actually you were ... out seeking signatures?
A: That's correct.
Q: You wanted to be able to hand this note to Tony?
A: I wanted to be able to hand him the note signed by an officer of Meridian Mor-
tgage, yes sir.3 6
By this time Kiritsis had concluded his performance before the cameras
and had taken Hall to another room in the building to await delivery of the
note. When he received it he carefully removed the shotgun rig from Hall's
neck, went to the window and fired it into the air. "I've been wanting to fire
that thing for three days," he said.
Hall was safe; Kiritsis was arrested; and the immunity agreement was im-
mediately repudiated by the prosecutors. Eight months later Kiritsis was tried
on charges of kidnapping, armed robbery"7 and armed extortion. After two
and one-half weeks of trial followed by two and one-half days of deliberation,
a jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
But what should be the verdict with regard to the lawyers? Were the pro-
secutors guilty of unconscionable conduct in their calculated deception regar-
ding immunity? Regardless of the outcome, did either Ruckelshaus or Wilson,
or both, exceed the "bounds of the law" in their representation of Kiritsis?
These problems will be examined in Part III of this article after a brief ex-
amination of a similar problem.
A BASIS FOR COMPARISION-ATTORNEYS AT ATTICA
The Kiritsis case is analogous to the problems faced during the 1971
prison uprising at Attica, New York, although there are obvious differences
apart from the sheer magnitude of the two events. Attica was not the result
of a carefully planned scheme hatched by a diseased mind with motives
of revenge and greed, but developed spontaneously and was related to
very real injustices within the American penal system. Those events have been
carefully documented and insightfully described elsewhere. 38 However, quite
6Id. at 657-59.
"The armed robbery charge was based on Kiritsis' forcible taking of a police car on the
morning of the abduction. See p. 682 supra.
"
6See generally, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]; T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE (1975) [hereinafter cited
as WICKER].
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similar in kind (but not in outcome) were the inmates' use of hostages as
leverage for their demands, the centrality among those demands of freedom
from criminal prosecutions (in their terms "amnesty"), and the roles of two
lawyers and a local prosecutor with respect to that crucial issue.
3 9
When inmates took control of portions of the New York penal facility at
Attica on September 9, 1971, and secured that control with hostage prison
employees, Herman Schwartz' offer to assist in the resolution of the problem
was quickly accepted by Commissioner of Corrections Russell G. Oswald.
40
Schwartz was a lawyer and a law professor from Buffalo and had provided
free legal services for a number of Attica inmates. Also, he had for years
been an active and successful proponent of prison law reform. He felt, as did
Oswald, that he could be trusted by both sides and therefore be an effective
mediator. Schwartz, along with New York Assemblyman Arthur 0. Eve, were
the first outsiders to enter the prison's D-yard, the stronghold of the rebellious
inmates. They received the prisoners' "immediate demands" that included:
(1) "complete amnesty" meaning "freedom for all and from all physical, men-
tal and legal reprisals;" (2) transportation to a "non-imperialistic" country;
(3) the intervention of federal authorities; (4) reconstruction of the prison
"done by inmates and/or inmates supervision"; (5) immediate negotiation
through several named or described persons, including attorney "Wm. M.
Kunstler"; and (6) negotiations to be carried out in the prisoners' "domain. '" 4 1
When Schwartz indicated that some of their demands (federal takeover,
flight from the country) were unrealistic, and suggested that more practical
ones be submitted, the inmate crowd turned ugly and "Eve had to jump to
his defense, citing Schwartz record on behalf of inmates." 42 Schwartz was to
make three more visits to the yard that day. As to his third visit, in the com-
pany of Commissioner Oswald, Schwartz testified:
"I saw it as a negotiating session. We could now get down to the business
of hammering out demands and trying to refine things in the way that I, in a
conventional lawyer's way, you meet together, you start negotiating. [But]
there was a lot of speech making and it confirmed to me, in my judgment
later, that what we were really facing here was not a negotiating session such
as in the labor-management context or anything like that, but between two
sovereign entities who had a deep hatred and distrust for each other.
43
During a later session that day Schwartz' attempt to stem the inmate
rhetoric and get to "meaningful" discussions caused a sharp decline in his
credibility with the inmates. However, he and Oswald did come away with a
"
9There were several other lawyers who played important roles at Attica as part of the
Observers Committee or as representatives of the State of New York. However, their particular
activities did not raise any of the questions that are explored in this article.
4 COMMISSION REPORT at 216-17.411d. at 205.421d. at 218.
4'1d. at 222.
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supplementary list of the inmates' "practical proposals" dealing with matters
such as prison wages, religious freedom, censorship, parole, medical care,
food, recreation, training of correction officers, inmate governance and
political activities. 44
During the fourth visit to D-yard at about 7:30 p.m. on the day of the
uprising, Schwartz agreed to seek on behalf of the prisoners, and with the
consent of Oswald, a federal court injunction against "physical or other ad-
ministrative reprisals against any inmates participating in the disturbance at
the Attica Correctional Facility on Sepember 9, 1971."45 Schwartz explained
to the inmates that the federal courts could not, under the circumstances, en-
join future state criminal prosecutions that might develop out of the takeover.
Schwartz, having drafted the injunction in collaboration with one of the in-
mate "jailhouse lawyers," took off on a weather plagued trip to Vermont
where the District Court judge having jurisdiction was attending a conference
with other area federal judges. He returned at 6:30 the following morning
with the signed federal court order.46 But his efforts were for naught. In-
mates, afraid of being tricked, claimed the order was not valid because it
lacked a seal. Moreover, it referred only to the events of the 9th, and it was
now the 10th. Schwartz vainly attempted to explain to the skeptical inmates
that a seal was unnecessary and that the order easily could be amended to in-
clude the current date. Finally, during Schwartz' fifth and final visit to
D-yard, "one of the 'inmate lawyers' grabbed the microphone and said, 'This
injunction is garbage. It doesn't give us criminal amnesty, it's limited to only
one day, and it doesn't have a seal.' With that, in full view of the hundreds
of assembled inmates, he ceremoniously ripped the injunction in two."14 7 And,
with that, Schwartz concluded that his effectiveness was at an end. The injuc-
tion, and his lawyerlike efforts in connection with it, were viewed as trickery
"further compounding the feeling of mistrust which pervaded the yard." 41
A few hours after Schwartz bowed out, another lawyer, William
Kunstler, made his entrance. Kunstler, as noted above, headed the list of
observers requested by the inmates. By the time of his arrival during the late
evening of the second day, it had become clear that the key to peaceful settle-
ment and the return of the prisoners' hostages was their demand for
amnesty. 49
At about 11:30 p.m. Kunstler and other members of a now assembled
"observers committee" entered D-yard with three objectives: (1) to get a com-
plete list of demands; (2) to ascertain the relative importance of these
demands; and (3) to get the inmates' views on how they wanted the observers
"Id. The complete text is reproduced in Wicker app. 2, at 317.
"COMMISSION REPORT at 225.
"Id. at 227.
4'1d. at 230.
41ld. at 231.
41Id. at 243.
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to function. 50 During this session the observers listened to a number of inmate
speeches and some, notably Kunstler, made speeches of their own. According
to Tom Wicker's chronicle, Kunstler left no doubt where he stood:
"The presentation of Bill Kunstler was a [big] moment. A recognizable
figure with his long hair and sideburns, his glasses characteristically pushed
up on his high forehead, Kunstler took the microphone confidently and
waited for the welcoming ovation of the inmates to die away.
" 'Palantel' he shouted, raising another roar. All power to the peoplel"51
During his speech Kunstler, according to Wicker, told the inmates "You have
power, which means you can reach ears." 52 Wicker, as well as other
observers, interpreted this as a clear reference to the hostages. When he
finished, one of the inmates asked Kunstler to become their lawyer, and he
agreed. 52
After they left the yard, some of the observers were critical of Kunstlers'
agreement to act as the inmates' attorney. Others rose to his defense "poin-
ting out that the confidence reposed in him by the inmates would facilitate a
settlement and provide a mechanism for the advocacy of the inmates' position
to the state.15
4
Kunstler was to become highly instrumental in the development of the so-
called "28-Points" which came to represent the State's final offer to the
rebellious inmates.5 5 These points covered, and in some instances elaborated,
the prisoners' 15 demands with three notable exceptions- amnesty, transpor-
tation to "non-imperalist" countries and the removal of the prison superinten-
dent.
The local prosecuting attorney, Louis R. James, had, despite the pleas
of influential members of the observers committee, refused on principle to
promise amnesty (or, more accurately, refused to assure the inmates of
his intent to exercise his discretion not to prosecute for crimes committed
by inmates during the uprising). He did, however, draft a letter prom-
ising the inmates that any criminal prosecutions that might arise out of the
incident would be conducted fairly and non-vindictively, and that such pro-
secutions would be initiated only when "there is substantial evidence to link a
specific individual with the commission of a specific crime."56 In short, James'
letter was a rather classic statement of the prosecutor's recognition of his
responsibility to exercise his broad discretionary powers in fairness to the peo-
ple he represents and to the potential defendants subject to his power. But
based on their perception of the inmates' basic mistrust of legal institu-
tions-especially those dependent upon the good faith of white, middle class
501d. at 244.
"
1WICKER at 76.
52Id. at 78.
"
3
COMMISSION at 247.
54Id.
15 The text is reprinted in WICKER app. 4, at 320-22.
6COMMISSION REPORT at 248-49.
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law enforcement officers - Kunstler and other lawyer members of the
observers committee, including Schwartz, not only declined to recommend
that the inmates accept this alternative to the demand for total amnesty, but
argued that because of its potential inflamatory effect it should not even be
read to the inmates. The earlier experience with the injunction seemed to
underscore this view.
Ultimately, however, along with the 28 points, James' promise of pro-
secutorial fairness was read to the prisoners, but with no observers' recom-
mendation of acceptance. It was characterized merely as a recitation of the
best deal they (the inmates) could expect. The initial reaction of the inmates
to the James letter was as predicted by Kunstler, and the 28 points suffered
the same fate as Schwartz' injunction-torn up in a blast of rhetoric by a
grandstanding inmate. At this point, the observers who had entered D-yard
to present the proposed settlement feared for their lives and they credit
Kunstler as their savior. As the mood turned ugly, Kunstler, whom the in-
mates trusted as their lawyer and political ally, rose to tell the angry mob
that he too looked upon the 28 points and the James letter as the best they
could expect. However, he told them, the decision was up to them and of-
fered no further advice. He also told the inmates that a corrections officer,
William Quinn, who had been attacked and injured during the initial
takeover, had died, and did nothing to relieve the impression that all of the
1500 or so inmates who were participating in the uprising might be
chargeable with murder because of his death. 57
Given the reception of the 28-points in D-yard, slim hope remained for a
peaceful settlement of the uprising. The stage was set for the forcible
takeover when last ditch efforts to persuade Governor Nelson Rockefeller to
appear personally at the prison also failed.
During his final visit to D-yard Kunstler delivered a speech that, if
anything, made a non-bloody settlement even more unlikely. For motives that
are at best murky, he announced over the inmates' public address system,
"There are four Third-world and African countries people across the street
from this prison prepared to provide asylum for everyone that wants to leave
this country from this prison."58 According to the McKay Commission:
• . .Kunstler explained that he had in fact spoken with four members of the
Black Panther party, who claimed to be conveying offers of asylum from
representatives of African and Asian countries. However, Kunstler admitted,
he had not spoken with representatives of any foreign countries, there was no
one waiting across the street, and the Panthers' proposals were limited to pro-
viding asylum only after inmates had completed their sentences.
Kunstler testified that after he was off the microphone he explained this
to a group of inmates who had expressed interest in flight and that when it
571d. at 266.
"IJd. at 290.
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became clear that the offer was limited to inmates who had been released
from prison, the interest quickly dissipated.5 9
Tom Wicker, who was one of the observers present in D-yard at the time,
reports more dramatically:
Kunstler then repeated Bobby Seale's version of why Seale had not
returned to D-yard. "He walked out of this prison, although he wanted to see
you, because he could not bring himself, as a black man, to come in here
and tell you what The Man wanted you to do."
Wicker, listening, was growing uncomfortable .... [H]ere was Kunstler
giving serious standing to the third-world flight proposition and putting for-
ward as fact the questionable contention that Oswald had refused to let Bob-
by Seale return unless he would advocate acceptance of the 28 points. No one
could calculate the net effect of these remarks or that of the effusive praise
[that other observers] had heaped on [the inmates in D-yard]. But all of this
was the sort of thing, surely, the inmates, wanted to hear. Was it what they
needed to hear?60
Wicker follows with the observation that:
The observers had said publicly that a massacre was in prospect unless
something- Rockefeller's intervention, for example-happened. But they
knew no such intervention was likely. Was it not therefore altogether prob-
able that a massacre was going to take place, that there would be no amnesty
and certainly no flights to the third world-just bloodshed and death? The
only visible alternative was for the inmates to end the revolt and accept the
28 points. The choice finally lay with them, if the state would not yield. Was
that not what the observers should have been telling the brothers?61
What followed is, of course, tragic history. Determining that a negotiated set-
tlement was not possible, the authorities ordered an assault on D-yard the
result of which was a retaking of the prison at the cost of ten hostages and
twenty-nine inmates killed, three hostages and eighty-five inmates wounded. 62
THE TERRORIST AS A CLIENT-A QUESTION OF LIMITS
The nature of the lawyer's role in our society demands that he or she
function within a system of law and legal institutions. The special relationship
that exists between lawyer and client is a vital aspect of that system. The cor-
nerstone of the relationship is trust reposed in the lawyer by the client, and
upon that cornerstone rest reciprocal obligations owed to the client by the
lawyer.
In the context of this discussion the question must be resolved whether
any of the special incidents of the lawyer-client relationship attach when the
19 1d. at 290-91.
6 WICKER at 241.
"Id.
6
"WicKR, at 314; COMMISSION REPORT app. D and E, at 496-506.
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"client" is committing a violent crime. The preceding summaries of the Kirit-
sis and Attica incidents reveal that in both cases the law enforcement
authorities perceived the value of letting the terrorists proceed at least as
legal negotiations were involved. Neither Tony Kiritsis nor the Attica inmates
would trust the authorities with whom they were dealing, and to supply a
foundation of trust the authorities invited (or at least welcomed) the interven-
tion of lawyers. Since the authorities perceived some advantage flowing to
them from an attorney-client relation, it would be improper for them later to
deny that such a relation could exist in the circumstances. It seems that an
attorney should be able to represent, as a client, a person who is engaged in
an act of terrorism, and that recognition of this fact is important to the pro-
tection of the terrorist's victim(s).
However, to admit the existence of the relation (and its attendant obliga-
tions) is only a beginning. What is the extent and direction of the lawyer's
obligation to his or her client? How can the representation of a terrorist client
be reconciled with the lawyer's obligation, as both professional and citizen, to
preserve the legal order and the lives of the hostages?
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility says that "a lawyer
should represent a client competently." Canon 7 admonishes a lawyer to
"represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." With regard to
these provisions the Code recognizes two related but importantly distinct
representational functions of advocate and adviser. 63 The limitations upon a
lawyer's conduct on behalf of a client within each of these roles also are quite
distinct. It is elementary that a lawyer may, in good conscience, advocate on
behalf of a client what he might not otherwise advise, so long as he does so
within those nebulous "bounds of the law." 64 Legitimate advocacy, of course,
assumes the existence of a colorable, non-frivolous legal position asserted in a
lawful manner for lawful purposes. 65 It follows from these considerations that
a lawyer undertaking to act on behalf of active terrorists initially should do so
only in an advisory capacity. In this capacity the first obligation of the lawyer
is to bring the matter "within the bounds of the law" by convincing his client
to seek to resolve his problems in a lawful way, and by assuring him of
zealous, competent representation in that regard. So, too, would a terrorist
be concerned for his personal safety should he surrender himself and his
hostage, and herein lies the beginnings of legitimate advocacy-to protect the
client from unlawful reprisals and to assure him of legal procedures.
However, persons who have gone so far as to take or use hostages for
negotiating leverage are unlikely to respond positively to such advice. Indeed,
a lawyer may reasonably conclude that if he tenders such advice he may be
lumped by the client with his adversaries, thereby undermining his client's
trust in him and, with that, making a peaceful resolution of the situation all
6sSee ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONALREsPONSIBILITY, EC 7-3 (1970).
54DR 7-102. Id., DR 7-102
65EC 7-4 Id. EC 7-4.
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the more difficult. For example, both Ruckelshaus and Wilson had past ex-
perience with Kiritsis and knew him to be suspicious, emotionally volatile and
incredibly stubborn. Not only was he unlikely to be responsive to their urg-
ings to surrender his hostage and to submit himself to legal process, such a
suggestion could well have increased the risk of harm as revealed by the
following testimony:
Prosecutor (P): Did you tell the Defendant of the potential legal conse-
quences of his current acts?
Wilson (W): Did I tell him that they were going to put him in jail or
shoot him or-
(P): Whatever-
(W): He knew they would shoot him and he told me he knew what he
did-what he had done. So I did not tell him, other than-that guy is a
human being that you are holding out there. I really didn't get on the sub-
ject because it was-I was a little bit afraid to do so frankly.
(P): Why?
(W): Well I didn't know what my client's reaction might have been.
(P): Okay. Did you tell the Defendant to release his hostage, give himself
up and put trust in his government?
(W): I told him to be mindful of the fact that he had a human being
and I got so very-I got so much-sort of adverse reaction out of that, that I
didn't go on and I never told him to trust his government.
(P): What kind of adverse reaction did you get from him as to the fact
that his victim was a human being?
(W): Well as I recall, he continued to refer to the fact that the blankety
blank had done so many blankety blank things to him and he [Hall] had not
considered his [Kiritsis] human side and he wasn't going to consider that man
human.66
Kiritsis, like the rebellious Attica inmates, was not to be moved by homilies
on the Rule of Law.
There may be a point at which a lawyer must inform his client that he
can no longer represent him because any further legal aid under the cir-
cumstances might place the lawyer in conflict with the law. Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A) (7) of the Code of Professional Responsibility warns a lawyer not to
"counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." The point is explicated in Ethical Consideration 7-5:
"[A lawyer] may continue in the representation of his client even though
his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of
the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage
in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never
encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on
how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor."
"Hearing Transcript at 710-11.
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The examples furnished by the drafters of the Code are not particularly
helpful in the present context since they contemplate a lawyer who secretly
advises his clients how to violate the law and get away with it, or who accepts
a retainer from an organization he knows to be operating unlawfully and
"agrees in advance to defend its members when from time to time they are
accused of crime arising out of its unlawful activities .... " 67 Professor Freed-
man points also to some ambiguity within the Code on this matter in that
"when the client 'seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct,' withdrawal
from the case by an attorney is 'permissive' [sic] but not 'mandatory'. '" 68
Freedman concludes that "the words 'Counsel or assist' refer to an active kind
of participation in the client's illegal act, going beyond merely giving advice
about the law" and that "by making withdrawal permissible, the Code leaves
the decision to the personal judgment of each attorney in all cases." 69
While I agree with this analysis it helps us only to conclude that lawyers
in the positions of Wilson and Ruckelshaus need not terminate their attorney-
client relationship because their client insists on carrying on with his criminal
conduct. We are left with the problem of what they can do, beyond advising
their client to cease and desist, without being found to have counselled or
assisted him in conduct that is so obviously criminal. We may locate the outer
reaches of the lawyer's permissible conduct at the point at which he would
become an accomplice chargeable with the criminal acts of his client. Here,
according to Judge Learned Hand: "It is not enough that [an aider and abet-
ter] does not forego a normally lawful activity, of the fruits of which he
knows that others will make an unlawful use; he must in some sense promote
the venture himself, make it his own, have a stake in its outcome." 70 Since a
lawyer's ethical standards must be higher than those that would permit him
merely to say "I am not a crook," his activity on behalf of a terrorist client
must cease well short of this outer limit.
I suggest the following general guideline: A lawyer may counsel and
negotiate on behalf of a terrorist holding hostages so long as his or her efforts
are directed to a peaceful resolution of the matter and so long as the lawyer
does not intentionally, knowingly or recklessly1 increase or prolong the
danger to the hostages. This rule limits the lawyer's advisory and representa-
tional acts and signals a point at which termination of the attorney-client
relationship would become necessary to avoid disciplinary sanction, and
perhaps even criminal responsibility. This standard tells the lawyer that he or
she, when called upon in the kind of situations described earlier in this arti-
61ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL Emics, OPINIONS, No. 281 (1952).
I'M. FREEDMAN, supra note 2 at 60.
691d.
7 United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), affd, 311 U.S. 205 See also W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 506-08 (1972).
"These states of mind should be defined as in the American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code § 2.02(2)
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cle, is not limited to either declining any representation or merely advising
the terrorist to give up his hostage(s) and surrender. Since, as noted above,
the basic value of recognizing the attorney-client relationship is to bridge the
gap of trust between the terrorist and the authorities, a certain amount of
"breathing space" must be allowed.
Applications of the Standard
While the private lawyers in the Kiritsis case had no articulated standard
by which to measure the propriety of their representation of their client, they
seem instinctively to have conformed to the guideline suggested above. Wilson
acted first as an intermediary through whom Kiritsis communicated his
specific demands. Also, both Ruckelshaus and Wilson, having represented
Kiritsis in the past, were able to inform the authorities that he was unlikely to
accept any corppromise -particularly as it related to immunity from prosecu-
tion. This information (confirmed by other sources) aided in developing the
bargaining strategy of the authorities and, under the circumstances, did
nothing to increase or prolong the danger to the hostage.
It was after the tender of the immunity promise in the emergency situa-
tion described above that the interaction of the prosecutors and Kiritsis'
lawyers took on an adversarial coloration. During his meeting with Rimstidt,
Ruckelshaus pressed him hard on the genuineness of the promise. The pro-
secutors had decided to carry out their bluff, and Ruckelshaus was attemp-
ting to preserve for his client a concession already made-not one that he had
demanded on his behalf. It seems clear that Ruckelshaus understood that the
promise not to prosecute Kiritsis for crimes relating to the Hall abduction
was, at best, voidable and that it rested entirely on the good faith of the pro-
secutors. The advice that Ruckelshaus was to give to his client reveals his
basic understanding that complete candor with Kiritsis would endanger the
hostage. He told the prosecutors that he would tell his client that the promise
of immunity was good so long as the prosecutor continued to honor it! This
was correct as a matter of law, but was equivocal and incomplete.
Assume that X calls upon his lawyer and tells him: "Y agreed to pay me
$1,000 and I agreed in return not to set fire to his house. While I have not
burned his house, Y refuses to pay me my $1,000. How can I collect?" Surely
the lawyer (before taking the client by the collar and showing him the door)
would explain that such an agreement is not only unenforceable because
of duress and absence of lawful consideration, but also that the actions
of the client amount to a most blatant form of extortion. Ruckeshaus
might similarly have informed Kiritsis that the prosecutor might feel in no
way bound to honor a promise extracted by threats of murder and arson, and
that the very act of demanding a written promise of immunity was itself a
form of criminal extortion.72 However, had Kiritsis received this information
"See IND. CODE § 35-17-5-14 (1976).
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he may have become even more dangerous. Hence, Ruckelshaus' proposed
advice, while incomplete, was appropriate both in terms of the attorney-client
relationship and his obligation to preserve the safety of the hostage.
However, two other points must be examined before we may conclude
that the lawyers' conduct complied fully with the proposed standard. First,
Ruckelshaus insisted upon a condition not demanded by Kiritsis, i.e., that
one of the prosecutors go on live TV to broadcast the promise of immunity to
Kiritsis. Second, he claims that had he discovered the prosecutors' duplicity
he would have so informed his client. The demand for the TV broadcast
seems to have been motivated by two concerns (1) to make it more difficult
for the prosecutors to repudiate the promise; and (2) by such a dramatic ex-
pression to make the promise seem genuine to Kiritsis. Since the prosecutors
readily agreed to the condition, the demand neither increased nor significant-
ly prolonged the danger to the hostage. Also, it was a method of confirming
the trustworthiness of the lawyer-as if to say: "Tony, I've made these guys
commit themselves in the most public way possible. If they back down on you
they will have to take a lot of heat."
As to the threat to blow the whistle on any sham (e.g., the discarded
plan to promise federal immunity by impersonating a federal official),
Ruckelshaus seemed to be attempting to protect his own integrity. In other
words, he was not to be made a party to a trick. But threatening to reveal
the lie and actually revealing it are two different things. The threat did not
increase or prolong the danger to the hostage. It merely required the
authorities to play out their hand. However, actually revealing to Kiritsis that
the promise of immunity was a sham would have seriously increased the
homicidal risk. Therefore, had Ruckelshaus become overtly aware of the pro-
secutors' intention he would have been under an obligation not to tell his
client. To disassociate himself from the prosecutors' actions, he might have
had to withdraw then and there from any further participation in the case.
Whether he would have been able to communicate his withdrawal to his
client would have been largely up to the authorities who controlled the lines
of access. 73
Wilson's efforts regarding the $5 million promissory note seem closely
similar to those of Ruckelshaus with respect to the immunity agreement. In
essence he was, perhaps less confidently than Ruckelshaus, attempting to walk
the thin line between an obligation to a client and a public duty. Wilson's in-
sistence (supported by Ruckelshaus) that the "agreement" be signed by an of-
ficer of the mortgage company avoided his having to consciously mislead his
client. However, this activity was taking place while Kiritsis was holding his
ISExcept for the press. Kiritsis was monitoring TV and radio coverage and presumably he
could have been reached through either electronic medium. Even if his electicity were to have
been cut off he may have had a battery operated radio.
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so-called "news conference" and a longer delay than was actually experienced
could have had serious consequences.
The actions of the private lawyers in the Kiritsis case were close to the
edge, but within the ethical standard suggested above. They did not seek out
their difficult assignments but were brought in at the request of the
authorities. To their credit they did not refuse to become involved and seem
admirably to have discharged their conflicting obligations to client and to
public.
While the dynamics of Attica (as well as the stakes) were different, the
standard for measuring the lawyers' ethical behavior is the same. Perhaps it is
because William Kunstler has made no pretense of divorcing his political
ideology from his professional role that his conduct as a lawyer at Attica
deserves lower marks. He did, of course, provide the vital linkage of trust bet-
ween the rebellious prisoners, and the New York authorities. However, at two
critical points he seemed actually to encourage the lawless action of his
clients. The first was during his initial appearance in D-yard when he made
an unmistakeable reference to the bargaining leverage the prisoners had
through their hostages. While it may have been useless to urge them to give
up at that point, this reinforcement of their intention to use the hostages as
bargaining points came very close to encouragement of their criminal activity.
The second and even more reckless statement came near the end when he
broadcast to the inmates in D-yard that certain "third-world" countries were
ready to provide transportation out of the United States. This untrue state-
ment could only have been calculated to discourage a settlement (i.e., the
28-points) that even Kunstler apparently believed was the best the prisoners
could get. At that point it was clear to outside observers that it was either
that settlement or deadly force. That is not only what they should have been
told at that point, but what a competent lawyer less affected by his own
political ideology and radical image must necessarily have told his clients.
I do not suggest that Kunstler's action (or nonaction) was the factual
cause of the succeeding events. I measure his conduct only by an ethical stan-
dard that does not depend upon a cause and effect relationship. It is the
lawyer's conduct alone that is to be scrutinized. Did he risk the increase or
prolongation of the danger to the hostages? If so, his conduct as a lawyer was
below standard. This is not meant as a pronouncement of guilt or a demand
for sanctions. In other ways Kunstler acted quite nobly at Attica. But the ex-
ample of his conduct as well as that of Ruckelshaus and Wilson must be kept
in mind by lawyers in the future who will, unfortunately, find themselves fac-
ed with similar choices.
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